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The Red Report

2430 Group's Red Report, is a curated bi-weekly encapsulation of recent, significant China-related events and policies, with our accompanying analyses.

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Our Research

A Typology of Chna's IP Thef Techniques

Chinese Disinformation Targeting Japan

This study identifies three key narratives targeting Japan that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has amplified and distorted to bolster CCP influence relative to Japan. The research for this study uncovered CCP IO activities targeting the U.S. and Taiwan, the APAC region, and Japan specifically. Key narratives involving and/or targeting Japan included online conversation about:

  • Fukushima Wastewater

  • US Military Bases & Independence for Okinawa

  • Korean Comfort Women

China Evades Sanctions & Threatens Global Resources

2430 Group exposed an attempt by a People’s Republic of China (PRC)-backed company, Norin Mining, to hide its connection to its sanctioned parent company while seeking to acquire an Australian private equity firm's shares of its copper mining operations in Zambia. Norin is entrenched in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and is attempting to expand into neighboring Zambia, where it appears intent on acquiring copper assets along the strategic Lobito Corridor. This corridor is the planned route of a rail line backed by the U.S. and the E.U. Norin’s acquisition would damage U.S. companies and mining interests, the U.S. sanctions’ regime, and U.S. foreign policy.

A Typology of China's Intellectual Property Theft Techniques

After decades of ignoring the problem, the United States and its allies now comprehend the national security, economic, and political consequences of the torrent of intellectual property (IP) that the People's Republic of China (PRC) diverts from foreign private companies. However, democratic governments are not and can never be fully equipped to protect millions of their private firms, especially without assistance from the private sector itself. Governments spend significant resources protecting state secrets, but governments and private firms spend almost nothing protecting sensitive, valuable private sector information. Private companies still do not understand the nature, scale, variety or consequences of the commercial espionage threat. And government does little to assist them...

China's Counter-Espionage Law: 
How Foreign Entities Can "De-Risk" China Exposure

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) introduced revisions to its counter-espionage law in April 2023 with the intention of broadening its definition of “national security.”¹ The amended law codifies the CCP’s increasing emphasis on a “holistic view” of national security (总体国家安全观), which considers potential security threats as emanating from an expansive range of different areas across the military, business, journalism, academia, and nonprofit sectors.² This, combined with the law’s definitional vagueness about what counts as “national security” and sweeping enforcement powers to punish offenders, means that the CCP has effectively crafted legal grounds on which it can prosecute any individual or entity that it deems as not aligning fully with the party’s interests.³ While the CCP maintains that it has possessed these capabilities since first passing the law in 2014—aided by further passage of implementation rules in 2017⁴ and Provisions on Counter-espionage Security Precautions in 2021—the amended law aims to legalize these efforts and potentially extend them overseas to include all Chinese citizens or even non-citizens of Chinese heritage living outside of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Big Tech Connections to the PRC Government

An OSINT and CSINT analysis in response to the following question:

  • Using open source information, is it possible to show direct, observable connections between China’s big tech firms and the PRC government?

Using the 2430 Group model of aligning questions/projects with our most capable partner for the task at hand, 2430 Group selected Govini and their National Security Knowledge Graph (NSKG) to analyze Alibaba and determine if any direct lines to the PRC are observable in OSINT/CSINT sources.
2430 Group experts guided Govini’s analysts through a detailed review of Alibaba’s key management personnel (KMPs) and the mapping of Alibaba’s partnerships, subsidiaries, and joint ventures. This analysis uncovered numerous direct fiduciary and controlling ties between Alibaba and majority Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

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