2430 Group Director, Glenn Chafetz writes in the April 25, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs that both the US government and private firms are now well aware of the infiltration of remote North Korean IT workers in the computer systems of thousands (if not tens of thousands) of US private sector computer systems. Yet, the response is nowhere near up to the task of solving the problem. The government lacks the resources to protect hundreds of thousands of US companies, and the companies themselves underestimate the risks of the problem to their operations, in part because of poor detection and reporting. Consequently, they take the path of least resistance and lowest immediate cost, which is doing nothing. Managers need to understand that this is not just a national security threat, which they should care about, but a business threat that can destroy revenue and value via ransomware, sabotage, and intellectual property theft.

2430 Group Fellow Michael Frank writes for the Project on Technology and National Security that US export controls on AI chips under the last two administrations have produced negative, unintended consequences. These include the acceleration of China’s native development of technology and a simultaneous loss of US leverage over China’s behavior. A more effective strategy would be to allow exports of some critical technology that would foster an instrumental dependence which could be exploited when useful to the United States.

In an article published in Modern Diplomacy, 2430 Group Director, Glenn Chafetz analyzes the US tilt toward Russia and finds that any benefits accruing to the United States from this policy would be small, dependent on the actions of unreliable partners, and in the future. The costs, by contrast, are significant and immediate.

Glenn Chafetz, director of 2430 Group, and Zachary Davis, author and former intelligence analyst, warn in this Defense One that the Trump administration's shift towards unilateral foreign policy is undermining nuclear nonproliferation, prompting more countries to pursue nuclear weapons. This will increase global instability and conflict, offering no clear benefits for U.S. security.

2430 Group’s Director, Glenn Chafetz explains in this article in The Strategist why splitting Russia and China is wishful thinking. Russia has many more key interests in common with China than it does with the United States.

2430 Group’s director Glenn Chafetz urges U.S. and allied leaders to recognize that Xi Jinping’s deep insecurity and need for absolute control are accelerating the pressure and timeline for him to use the PLA against Taiwan—and the time to prepare is limited.

US and allied export controls are failing to stop critical microelectronics from reaching sanctioned adversaries like Russia and Iran. Weak supply chain oversight, inconsistent due diligence, and industry resistance to stricter controls have enabled a global gray market for these components, undermining national security and costing American lives.

This paper analyzes the widespread availability of US components used in Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and specifically:

• documents the methodology used to track critical components and their
  distribution channels;

• presents four detailed findings that reveal significant vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain and distribution networks; and

• offers five practical recommendations for government and industry to help disrupt the flow of US technology to adversary states.