US and allied export controls are failing to stop critical microelectronics from reaching sanctioned adversaries like Russia and Iran. Weak supply chain oversight, inconsistent due diligence, and industry resistance to stricter controls have enabled a global gray market for these components, undermining national security and costing American lives.

This paper analyzes the widespread availability of US components used in Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and specifically:

• documents the methodology used to track critical components and their
  distribution channels;

• presents four detailed findings that reveal significant vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain and distribution networks; and

• offers five practical recommendations for government and industry to help disrupt the flow of US technology to adversary states.

This study identifies three key narratives targeting Japan that the CCP has amplified and distorted to bolster CCP influence relative to Japan.

2430 Group exposed an attempt by a China-backed company, Norin Mining, to hide its connection to its sanctioned parent company while seeking to acquire an Australian private equity firm's shares of its copper mining operations in Zambia.

After decades of ignoring the problem, the US and its allies are starting to comprehend the national security, economic, and political consequences of the torrent of intellectual property that China diverts from foreign private companies.

Is it possible to show direct, observable connections between China’s big tech firms and the PRC government? Our analysis uncovers numerous direct fiduciary and controlling ties between Alibaba and Chinese State Owned Enterprises.