This document is a categorized reference list of the major laws, regulations, and frameworks that shape the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, and Russia’s contemporary national-security and counter-espionage environment.

RedNote, a short-form video and augmented reality platform better known in Mandarin as xiaohongshu, or “little red book,” has rapidly gained traction in recent years as an alternative to the video blogging service TikTok, especially among younger users drawn to its immersive alternate reality features and tailored content feeds. Like TikTok, RedNote offers algorithmically driven entertainment; however, its underlying infrastructure and legal obligations differ in critical ways. While TikTok has faced scrutiny over its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, and its opaque data practices, RedNote is even more closely aligned with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) surveillance architecture. Promoted as a creative social app, RedNote conforms to PRC policy of surveillance-by-design, requiring extensive data extraction, non-transparent content moderation, and legally mandated state access to user information. This closer look examines how RedNote operates within—and extends—the global reach of China’s digital governance model.

The author, Christian Ryan, is an open-source national security researcher and a Research Fellow at Trefoil Strategies Ltd., a Pittsburgh-based risk consultancy.

US and allied export controls are failing to stop critical microelectronics from reaching sanctioned adversaries like Russia and Iran. Weak supply chain oversight, inconsistent due diligence, and industry resistance to stricter controls have enabled a global gray market for these components, undermining national security and costing American lives.

This paper analyzes the widespread availability of US components used in Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and specifically:

• documents the methodology used to track critical components and their
  distribution channels;

• presents four detailed findings that reveal significant vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain and distribution networks; and

• offers five practical recommendations for government and industry to help disrupt the flow of US technology to adversary states.

China is increasingly its espionage and infiltration techniques against the US in the lead up to the November 2024 election. 2430 Group summarizes some of the CCP’s most prominent techniques.

This study identifies three key narratives targeting Japan that the CCP has amplified and distorted to bolster CCP influence relative to Japan.

2430 Group exposed an attempt by a China-backed company, Norin Mining, to hide its connection to its sanctioned parent company while seeking to acquire an Australian private equity firm's shares of its copper mining operations in Zambia.

After decades of ignoring the problem, the US and its allies are starting to comprehend the national security, economic, and political consequences of the torrent of intellectual property that China diverts from foreign private companies.

Is it possible to show direct, observable connections between China’s big tech firms and the PRC government? Our analysis uncovers numerous direct fiduciary and controlling ties between Alibaba and Chinese State Owned Enterprises.